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NOTES
CONSUMER PICKETING AFTER LECHMERE,
INC. v. NLRB: THE PHENOMENON OF
"IMPULSE BUYING"
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act (NLRA)
grants an employee the right to establish or affiliate with a labor organization.1 Furthermore, the rights guaranteed by Section 7 are protected
by Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, which defines as an unfair labor practice
any interference, restraint or coercion by an employer in the exercise of
rights guaranteed under Section 72 Although Section 7 rights do not expressly grant a union access to private property, the United States
Supreme Court identified grounds upon which union representatives
would be permitted to engage in union activities on private property in
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.3 The availability of this right, though
not absolute, can be essential during an organizing campaign when it may
be necessary for nonemployee union organizers to communicate with
targeted employees, or when a union's strategy entails communication
with consumers through the distribution of handbills and literature or by
picketing.4 Accommodation of nonemployee union representatives'
1. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). In particular, Section 7 provides:

Id.

Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities ....

2. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1988).
3. 351 U.S. 105, 112-14 (1956). The Court stated that when nonemployee union
members' reasonable attempts to communicate with employees are made ineffective by the
inaccessibility of the employees, an employer's right to exclude the nonemployee union
members from private property must yield to the extent necessary for the communication
of the information. Id. at 113.
4. See FRoiAN BARTOSIC & ROGER C. HARTLEY, LABoR RELATIONS LAW IN THE
PRIVATE SECTOR 34, 44-45 (1977) (identifying instances where union activities included

distribution of literature, handbilling and picketing); see also STEPHEN I. SCHLOSSnnRo &
JuDrrH A. ScoTt, ORGANIZI
AND am LAW 45 (4th ed. 1991) (describing a typical union
organization campaign and the factors involved). See generally Hudgens v. NLRB, 424
U.S. 507, 509 (1976) (involving the picketing of an employer's warehouse and nine retail
stores).
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rights, however, must be achieved while observing an employer's prop-

erty rights, and there should be "'as little destruction of one as is
consistent with the maintenance of the other."'s Thus, with the "accommodation" approach set forth in Babcock & Wilcox,6 the Court fostered a
balancing test to be administered by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or the Board) when adjudicating unfair labor practice cases. The

Board's objective in such instances is to evaluate equitably all competing
property and statutory interests of the respective parties. 7 Fulfilling this
objective has generated considerable litigation, particularly before the
NLRB.8
Over the years, courts have defined what constitutes picketing and what its essential
elements are. For instance, merely holding placards and patrolling an area does not constitute picketing absent exigent circumstances. See FLORIAN BARTOSiC & ROGER C. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE SEcroR 229 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
BARTOSIC & HARTLEY, 1986 ed.]. Rather, the pickets must confront employees, suppliers,
or consumers in some manner. Id.; see, e.g., Chicago 1ypographical Union No. 16 (Alden
Press, Inc.), 151 N.L.R.B. 1666 (1965) (holding that carrying placards through a shopping
center constituted publicity and not picketing). Courts and the NLRB have, however,
found picketing to have occurred in situations where the pickets simply placed signs up and
left them, without actually patrolling. See, e.g., Local 182, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 135
N.L.R.B. 851 (1962) (involving pickets who placed signs in a snow bank and sat in
automobiles to protect themselves from the cold), enforced, 314 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1963).
Furthermore, in NLRB v. United Furniture Workers, 337 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1964), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit formulated a test to determine
whether the conduct of a union entailed the necessary confrontation to constitute picketing. That is, courts should ask whether the presence of the union representatives who
posted their signs and then sat in automobiles "was intended to and did have substantially
the same significance for persons entering the employer's premises as if [the union representatives] had remained with the signs." Id. at 940; see also BARTOsic & HARTLEY, 1986
ed., supra, at 229. According to the National Labor Relations Board, "[t]he important
feature of picketing appears to be the posting.., at the approach to a place of business to
accomplish a purpose which advances the cause of the union, such as keeping employees
away from work or keeping customers away from the employer's business." Lumber &
Sawmill Workers Local Union No. 2797, 156 N.L.R.B. 388, 394 (1965).
5. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507,521 (1976) (quoting NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956)).
6. 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Dillard's, Inc., 305 N.L.R.B. 1102, 1103 (1992) (involving a handbilling
campaign outside the entrances of a retail store); JMB Properties Co., 305 N.L.R.B. 978,
979 (1991) (upholding a property owner's right to prohibit peaceful handbilling at the interior mall entrance of a retail store); Makro, Inc., 305 N.L.R.B. 663, 667-68 (1991) (granting
the union access to picket on private property at the store's entrance and exit); Oakland
Mall, Ltd., 304 N.L.R.B. 832 (1991) (upholding the rights of a union to handbill at store
entrances on private property); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 304 N.L.R.B. 58, 60 (1991) (permitting a union to picket and handbill in front of auto centers); Wegmans Food Mkts., Inc., 300
N.L.R.B. 868, 869-71 (1990) (involving informational handbilling by the union on private
property open to the public); Sparks Nugget, Inc., 298 N.L.R.B. 524, 534 (1990) (ordering
an employer to allow picketing and handbilling at the rear customer entrance to a hotel
and casino-private property open to the public), enforcement granted in part and denied
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Recently, in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 9 the United States Supreme
Court addressed-for the sixth time in thirty-five years-the issue of employer private property rights as they vie against the rights of nonemin part, 968 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1992); Red Food Stores, Inc., 296 N.L.R.B. 450, 451-54
(1989) (dismissing a union complaint involving the right to picket and handbill on private
property open to the public); Sentry Mkts., Inc., 296 N.L.R.B. 40, 41-42 (1989) (allowing
striking union representatives to handbill at store entrance), review denied, enforcement
granted, 914 F.2d 113 (7th Cir. 1990); Lechmere, Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 92, 94-97 (1989) (authorizing nonemployee union organizers to distribute handbills in an employer's parking
lot at a shopping center), review denied, enforced, 914 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S.
Ct. 841 (1992); Tecumseh Foodland, 294 N.L.R.B. 486, 490-91 (1989) (involving nonemployee union representatives and members picketing and handbiling on private property
open to the public); Granco, Inc., 294 N.L.R.B. 173, 174-75 (1989) (upholding the rights of
a nonemployee union representative to picket and handbill at a store entrance and on a
private parking lot); Dolgin's, 293 N.L.R.B. 845, 846 (1989) (permitting union access to
retail store entrances for picketing and handbiling purposes); Mountain Country Food
Store, Inc., 292 N.L.R.B. 967, 968 (1989) (involving striking union employees picketing
directly in front of retail grocery stores), enforcement denied, 931 F.2d 21 (8th Cir. 1991);
Karatjas Family Lockport Corp., 292 N.L.R.B. 953, 954-56 (1989) (providing for informational picketing and handbilling near store entrances and parking areas by union); Target
Stores, 292 N.L.R.B. 933, 934-35 (1989) (involving union picketing and handbilling on private property in order to protect area standard wage rates); D'Alessandro's, Inc., 292
N.L.R.B. 81, 82-83 (1988) (allowing nonemployee union agents to picket and handbill at
the entrances of a grocery store); W.S. Butterfield, Inc., 292 N.L.R.B. 30,31 (1988) (involving employees of other theaters picketing and handbilling on private property open to the
public); Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11, 14-16 (1988) (permitting nonemployee union representatives to picket on private property in front of store entrance); North Star Drilling
Co., 290 N.L.R.B. 826, 827-29 (1988) (providing access for nonemployee union organizers
soliciting on an oil rig), affd mem., 877 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1989); Homart Dev. Co., 286
N.L.R.B. 714, 715 (1987) (involving nonemployee union agents handbilling on private
property open to the public); Providence Hosp., 285 N.L.R.B. 320, 321 (1987) (allowing
informational picketing by off-duty employees and nonemployees on hospital property);
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 1138, 1139 (1987) (involving nonemployee union representatives and agents picketing and handbilling at restaurant entrances inside a bus station); Browning's Foodland, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 939, 941-43 (1987) (dealing with
nonemployee union members employed at area stores picketing and handbilling on private
property open to the public); Fairmont Hotel Co., 282 N.L.R.B. 139, 145-46 (1986) (involving nonemployee union representatives handbilling at a hotel entrance); Ameron Automotive Ctrs., 265 N.L.R.B. 511, 512 (1982) (involving organizers on a sidewalk by a private
store entrance and in a public cafeteria); Montgomery Ward & Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 60,69-70
(1982) (providing access for consumer handbilling on private property open to the public);
Hutzler Bros. Co., 241 N.L.R.B. 914, 915 (1979) (involving nonemployees engaging in organizational activities on a private sidewalk adjacent to a store entrance open to the public), rev'd, enforcement denied, 630 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1980); Giant Food Markets, Inc., 241
N.L.R.B. 727 (1979) (discussing picketing and handbilling on private property open to public in line with area standards), enforcement denied, 633 F.2d 18 (6th Cir. 1980); Holland
Rantos Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 726 (1978) (addressing striking employees picketing on private
property not open to the public), affd, 583 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1978); Rochester Gen. Hosp.,
234 N.L.R.B. 253, 254-55 (1978) (involving union organizers engaging in activities in the
parking lot and main entrance of a hospital); Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. 414, 415 (1977)
(involving striking employees picketing on private property open to the public).
9. 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
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ployee union organizers. 10 In rejecting the findings of both the NLRB"

and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 2 the Lechmere majority held that store employees were accessible to nonemployee
union representatives outside of the employer's property and that the
employer did not, therefore, commit an unfair labor practice by barring
union organizers from its property.'" In its decision, the Court did not

address the issue of "impulse buying"' 4 on the part of consumers, and

failed to distinguish the grounds upon which a union's right of access to
consumers may be granted.'" The Court did, however, promulgate a
calculus to be applied in all cases involving union access to private property; that is, an employer can lawfully exclude union organizers from its
property as long as the target audience is deemed to otherwise be accessi-

without violating the private property rights
ble to union representatives
16
of the employer.
Lechmere arose out of an attempted organizing campaign by Local 919

of the United Food and Commercial Workers Union, which sought to
organize the retail store employees of Lechmere, Inc.' 7 Lechmere owned
and operated a retail store located in the Lechmere Shopping Plaza in
Newington, Connecticut.'" Lechmere also owned part of the plaza's

parking lot, a section of which was designated as the employees' parking
lot.'9 Union representatives entered the parking lot and placed handbills
on the windshields of cars parked in the employees' section.' Lechinere
prohibited this solicitation, removed the handbills that had been distrib10. Id. at 842; see also Roger C. Hartley, The Supreme Court's 1991-92 Labor and
Employment Law Term, Speech to the Section on Labor and Employment Law, American
Bar Association (Aug. 10-12, 1992), in 140 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 528,529 (Aug. 24, 1992)
("Lechmere v. NLRB represents the Supreme Court's sixth effort in thirty-five years to
accommodate the interests of property owners seeking trespass protection with workers'
competing interest in obtaining information regarding the benefits of self-organization.").
11. 295 N.L.R.B. 92 (1989), review denied, enforced, 914 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1990), rev'd,
112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
12. 914 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 814 (1992).
13. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 850.
14. Impulse buying is defined as "[a]n act of purchasing, made on the spur-of-themoment, impelled by some thing or happening in a store." IRVING J. SHAPIRO, DIcrnoNARY OF MARKMEING TERMS

125 (4th ed. 1981). Specific forms of impulse buying include:

planned impulse buying; pure impulse buying; reminder impulse buying; and suggestion
impulse buying. Id.; see also infra notes 168-79 and accompanying text.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 168-79 for a complete discussion of impulse
buying; see supra note 4 and accompanying text for a discussion of the necessity and permissibility of union access to private property.
16. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 848.
17. Id. at 843.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 844.
20. Id.
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uted by the union, and denied the union organizers access to the lot on
several subsequent occasions.21 The union representatives then relocated
themselves on a public strip of land adjacent to the parking lot and continued their organizing efforts by distributing handbills, picketing, and recording
license plate numbers of cars parked in the employee area of the
lot. 22
The union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board, alleging
that Lechmere violated the NLRA by barring the nonemployee organizers from its property. 3 An administrative law judge found that the
union organizers were entitled to access to the parking lot,24 relying on
the precedent established in the Board's previous decision in Fairmont
Hotel Co.'

The administrative law judge recommended, inter alia, that

Lechmere cease disallowing union representatives access to its parking
lot for handbilling and organizing purposes. 6 The Board affirmed the
21. Id.
22. Id. Through their efforts, the union representatives were able to directly contact
approximately 20% of the nonsupervisory employees and sent out four mailings to the
employees. However, these efforts only resulted in one signed union authorization card.
Id.
23. Id.; see also infra notes 4148 and accompanying text (discussing the NLRA).
24. Lechmere, Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 92, 98-100 (1989), review denied, enforced, 914 F.2d
313 (1st Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992). In ordering Lechmere to grant the union
access, the administrative law judge found a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. Id.
at 100. Under Section 8(a)(1), an unfair labor practice is considered to exist if an employer
"interfere[s] with, restrain[s], or coerce[s] employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed" in Section 7. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1988).
25. 282 N.L.R.B. 139 (1986), overruled by Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988). Fairmont Hotel set forth a framework for resolving conflicts between the private property
rights of employers and the rights enumerated in Section 7 of the NLRA. Id. at 14143.
Under Fairmont Hotel, the relative strength of each party's claim must be weighed. Id. at
142. Accordingly, a strong claim by an employer would prevail over a less compelling
statutory right, yet a tenuous property right must give way to a statutory right that clearly
is more compelling. Id. Only when the respective claims of each party were relatively
equal in strength would alternative means of communicating with employees be determinative. Id.
26. Lechmere, 295 N.L.R.B. at 100. The administrative law judge applied the criteria
set forth in Fairmont Hotel, in which the Board identified its task as weighing the relative
strength of each party's claim and allowing the stronger claim to prevail. Id. at 98-100.
The union also alleged that Lechmere violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by installing
a revolving video-tape camera on the roof of the store. Id. at 98. The administrative law
judge did not, however, find that such a violation had taken place. Id. at 99-100. Rather,
the administrative law judge ruled that "[ain employer may photograph or videotape certain activities outside his plant without violating the Act where he can establish a legitimate purpose for this activity." Id. at 99; see Russell Sportswear Corp., 197 N.L.R.B. 1116
(1972), enforcement denied sub nom. S.W. Noggle Co. v. NLRB, 478 F.2d 1144 (8th Cir.
1973). But see Sparks Nugget, Inc., 298 N.L.R.B. 524, 534 (1988) (holding that the employer engaged in unlawful surveillance of the union activities of employees and others by
photographing those activities), enforcement granted in part and denied in part, 968 F.2d
991 (9th Cir. 1992).
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decision of the administrative law judge upon review, but invoked a different standard applying to cases involving access to private property. 27
The Board's decision relied upon the balancing test set forth in Jean

enforced by the United States Court of
Country,' and was subsequently
29

Appeals for the First Circuit.

The United States Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit's deci-

sion.30 The majority, relying on the plain terms of the NLRA, reiterated
the holding in Babcock & Wilcox that an employer normally cannot be
compelled to allow nonemployee union organizers on its property.31 The
Court reasoned that Section 7 only protects nonemployee union organizers when the inaccessibility of employees makes reasonable attempts to communicate with them through usual channels ineffective.3 2

The majority asserted that the facts of the case did not justify invoking
the rare exception to the general rule, and thereby sustained the employers' private property rights.33 The Court reversed the Board's factual
finding that the union did not have reasonable effective means of commu27. Lechmere, 295 N.L.R.B. at 92.

28. 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988). The Board set forth a detailed analytical approach that
assessed three factors: "the degree of impairment of the Section 7 right if access should be
denied, as it balances against the degree of impairment of the private property right if
access should be granted." Id. at 14. The Board considered the availability of a reasonably
effective alternative means of exercising the Section 7 right as a third significant factor. Il
Hence, the Board overruled FairmontHotel to the extent that it allowed for the reasonable
alternative factor to be considered only when the property rights involved are relatively
equal to the statutory rights asserted by the union. d at 11.
29. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
The First Circuit determined that the "adjudicatory task" in this situation is satisfied by
arriving at a fair balance between the Section 7 rights of employees and the property rights
of employers "'with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the
other."' Id. at 318 (quoting Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507,521 (1976) (quoting NLRB v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956))). Writing for the majority, Judge Selya
endorsed the Jean Country analytical approach as "a useful analytic model for resolution of
access-to-property cases." Id at 321. While endorsing Jean Country, the judge also declared that "the Board's chosen decisional model is entitled to judicial respect." Id. at 318.
According to Judge Selya, the "crux of the dispute" was the availability of reasonable alternative means of communication, which were lacking in Lechmere. Id at 322.
Judge Torruella argued strenuously in dissent that reliance on the Jean Country approach had distorted the majority's analysis of alternative means of communication. See
id. at 326-28 (Torruella, J., dissenting). He asserted that the similarities in the factual circumstances of Lechmere and Babcock & Wilcox demanded a finding that the union could
have communicated its message by other means. Id.
30. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 850 (1992).
31. 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956).
32. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 845. Justice Thomas delivered the majority opinion, in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy and Justice Souter joined. Id. at 843.
33. Id. at 850.
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nicating with employees, and held that the Board erred in reaching its
conclusion that Lechmere had committed an unfair labor practice.34
Justice White, in dissent, 35 argued that the Board correctly made an
"accommodation" of the competing Section 7 interests and the private
property interests under the Babcock & Wilcox and Hudgens v. NLRB 36
rulings. 37 Moreover, the dissent argued that there are cases in which access to private property must be granted under Section 7 and that this
access should not be limited solely to instances when reasonable alternative access is infeasible.3 8 Rather, Justice White asserted that under previous cases, the Court viewed reasonable alternative means as "an
important factor in finding the least destructive accommodation between
§ 7 and property rights."39 Finally, Justice White argued that the Court
failed to give proper deference to the Board's interpretation of Section
740
34. Id.
35. Id. at 850-54 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun joined Justice White's dissent. Id. Justice Stevens dissented separately for reasons similar to those of Justice White,
however, he did not join Justice White's opinion "to the extent that it suggest[ed] that the
Babcock case was incorrectly decided." Id. at 854 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Rather, according to Justice Stevens, the Court's "central holding" in Babcock & Wilcox was both
correct and in accordance with the modem legal principle of granting deference to administrative agencies. Id.
36. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
37. See Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 850-52 (White, J., dissenting). The Babcock & Wilcox
accommodation approach involved a two pronged test whereby an employer "may validly
post his property against nonemployee... [access] if [1] reasonable efforts by the union
through other available channels of communication will enable it to reach the employees
with its message and [21 if the employer's notice or order does not discriminate against the
union." NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956). The Hudgens calculus
stated that the point of accommodation "'may fall at differing points along the spectrum
depending on the nature and strength of the respective § 7 rights and private property
rights asserted in any given context," and the Board was responsible for making the decision. Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. 414, 415 (1977) (quoting Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 522).
dissenting).
38. Lechmere, 112 S.Ct. at 852 (White, J.,
39. Id. Justice White argued that the Court has issued rulings consistent with the view
propounded in 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988). Lechmere, 112 S.Ct. at 852 (White, J., dissenting).
For a discussion of the three factors considered in the Jean Country balancing test, see
supra text accompanying note 28.
40. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 853 (White, J., dissenting). According to Justice White, the
Court failed to follow the standards set forth in the cases following Babcock & Wilcox
regarding statutory construction by courts and agencies. Id Moreover, the Court's rejection of both the Board's interpretation of the accommodation principle and the Jean Country analysis "is at odds with modern concepts of deference to an administrative agency
charged with administering a statute." Id. at 852. Congress has recognized the importance
of organized labor and delegated to the Board the authority over how Section 7 rights and
private property rights were to be accommodated under the NLRA. Id. at 853. Therefore,
according to Justice White, "a court should not substitute its own judgment for a reasonable construction by the Board." Id. Cf.Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S.Ct. 1759 (1991) (holding
that an agency's construction of the statute is not considered an abuse of discretion if it is a
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This Note first examines the origin and ensuing evolution of the National Labor Relations Act and Section 7 rights. It then considers the
interpretations of the National Labor Relations Board and the Supreme

Court regarding Section 7 rights in cases involving union access to private
property, and analyzes the Supreme Court's application of the accommo-

dation approach. Next, this Note analyzes the Supreme Court's decision
in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, focusing on the prospective application of the
Lechmere calculus to cases of consumer picketing and handbilling where
the union is not engaged in organizational activity. This Note examines
the extent to which the rules set forth in Lechmere apply to the issue of
consumer handbilling and picketing, exploring in detail the impact of
"impulse buying" as a factor in evaluating such cases. Finally, this Note
concludes that the dynamics of communicating to consumers are far different from union organizational activities and communications targeted
at a finite group of employees. Since the Lechmere calculus will be applied to future cases involving union access to market customers, the
Court must recognize the validity of impulse buying and its impact upon
union access rights.
I. THE

EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION REGARDING
UNION ACCESs

A.

To

PRIVATE PROPERTY

Creation and Evolution of the National Labor Relations Act

In 1935, the United States Congress enacted the Wagner Act, otherwise
known as the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 4 ' Since then, the
NLRA has remained the "cornerstone of federal labor relations policy."v42 Section 7 of the Act was designed, interalia, to guarantee employplausible construction of the plain language of the statute and otherwise does not conflict
with congressional intent); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (holding that where Congress has not spoken to the precise
question at issue, the court must determine whether the agency's view is based on a permissible construction of the statute before imposing its own construction of the statute).
41. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988). See generally Karl E. Klare, JudicialDeradicalization
of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness,1937-1941, 62 MiNN. L.

REv. 265, 265-339 (1978) (describing the historical effect the Wagner Act had on the
American political economy).
42. BARTOSIC & HARTLEY, 1986 ed., supra note 4, at 15. The most important provisions of the National Labor Relations Act are as follows:
[A]. Section 1 addresses the findings and policies which served as the impetus for the Act.
Recognition is given to the impact of the inequality of bargaining power between employees and employers and its effect on the free flow of commerce. The Act designates the
elimination of such obstructions to be the policy of the United States. Under Section 1,
this federal policy is to be achieved by encouraging collective bargaining and by protecting
the rights of workers to negotiate terms of employment or other protective measures. 29
U.S.C. § 151.
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ees the right to join labor unions, bargain collectively, and engage in
other concerted activity.4 3 Furthermore, the Act created the National
Labor Relations Board (the Board), which was authorized to prevent and

remedy unfair labor practices and conduct representation elections
among employees. 44
In the years following the enactment of the NLRA, the strength and
number of unions grew at a rapid pace.45 The focus of national labor
policy shifted toward guaranteeing employees both the right to engage in,
and the right to refrain from engaging in, concerted activities originally
protected by Section 7. 46 In furtherance of this goal, Congress, in 1947,
enacted the Taft-Hartley Act, officially cited as the Labor-Management
Relations Act (LMRA). 47 The LMRA engendered a number of signifi[B]. Section 2 defines terms used in the Act, inter alia, defining the term "employer,"

"employee," and "labor organization." Id. § 152.
[C]. Section 3 sets forth the organization of the National Labor Relations Board; Sections
4 and 5 involve administrative matters of the Board; and Section 6 grants the Board power
to make, amend and rescind rules and regulations. Id. § 153.
[D].
Section 7 guarantees employees the right to join and the right to refrain from joining a labor organization; the right to bargain collectively or to refrain from such activity, as
well as the right to engage in concerted activities or to refrain therefrom. Id. § 157.
[E]. Section 8 defines unfair labor practices regulating both the employer and the union.
Id. § 158.
[F]. Section 9 provides for the NLRB to elect representatives and outlines the manner in
which the elections are to be conducted. Id. § 159.
[G]. Section 10 deals with the prevention of unfair labor practices and the general power
of the Board. It grants the Board power to prevent and remedy unfair labor practices and
establishes the procedure to be used by the Board in handling such cases. Furthermore, it
grants the Board power to issue orders and provides for judicial review thereof by the
federal courts of appeals, which may subsequently enforce the orders of the NLRB. Id.
§ 160; see also BARTOSiC & HARTLEY, 1986 ed., supra note 4, at 16-17.
43. BARTosic & HARTLEY, 1986 ed., supra note 4, at 15; see also 29 U.S.C. § 157.
44. BARrosic & HARTLEY, 1986 ed., supra note 4, at 15; see 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAWv 40.41 (Charles J. Morris et al. eds., 2d ed. 1983) (describing various amendments
that were proposed during the development of the NLRA) [hereinafter DEVELOPING LABOR LAw].

45. BARTOSIC & HARTLEY, 1986 ed., supra note 4, at 16. The expansion of unions
grew out of the overall labor climate, shaped by the Norris-LaGuardia and Wagner Acts.
See 1 DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 44, at 35-36. Between 1935 and 1947, union
membership grew from three to five million, and in industries such as construction, mining,
and trucking, collective bargaining agreements affected four fifths of all workers. Id. The
importance and prestige attached to union leadership positions is a possible explanation
for the flourishing of unions following World War II. Id. Government policy making often
included consultation with union leaders, primarily to ensure stability and productivity
within various industries. See id.
46. BARTOSIC & HARTLEY, 1986 ed., supra note 4, at 16.
47. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144
(1988)); see BARTOSIC & HARTLEY, 1986 ed., supra note 4, at 16.
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cant changes, perhaps the most important of which allowed suits to be
brought by or against unions. 4
B.

The Supreme Court, the NLRB and Section 7 Rights

The Supreme Court first visited the question of an employer's right to
deny nonemployee union organizers access to its property in NLRB v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co.49 In that case, union organizers attempted to exercise their Section 7 rights, and the Board found that, by denying the
union organizers limited access to distribute union literature on companyowned parking lots, the employer had unlawfully interfered with the employees' right to self-organization.5 0 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit denied the Board's petition for enforcement. 51 The
Supreme Court, however, limited the Fifth Circuit's ruling that private
property interests always override the employees' interest in receiving information about self-organization from union organizers on company
52
property.
The Supreme Court adopted a two-pronged test that allowed an employer to refuse nonemployees access to his property if: (1) the union
could effectively reach employees with its message through reasonable
communication efforts; and (2) the refusal of access did not discriminate
against the nonemployee union representatives.5 3 Given the particular
48. BARTOSIC & HARTLEY, 1986 ed., supra note 4, at 16. In addition, the LMRA
"created machinery for dealing with national emergency disputes, established the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service [and] gave federal courts jurisdiction to decide suits for
violation of collective bargaining agreements." Id. Subsequent amendments were made to
both the NLRA and the LMRA in 1974 and 1980. The 1974 amendments extended coverage to employees of nonprofit hospitals, previously excluded from protection. Id.; see Pub.
L. No. 93-360 § 1(a), 88 Stat. 395 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 152(14)
(1988)). In addition, the 1974 amendments enacted special provisions for labor disputes
involving health care institutions. BARTOSIC & HARTLEY, 1986 ed., supra note 4, at 16; see
§ 1(e), 88 Stat. 395 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (1988)). Individuals covered by union security clauses who have religious objections to union membership are also
protected by the 1980 amendments. BARTOSIC & HARTLEY, 1986 ed., supra note 4, at 16.
49. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
50. Id. at 107-08. The demographics of the situation help to explain the importance of
union access to the company parking lot. Babcock & Wilcox was located in a community
of some 21,000 people. Approximately 40 of the employees lived in town and the remaining employees lived within a 30 mile radius. Over ninety percent of Babcock & Wilcox's
500 employees drove to work in private automobiles and parked on a company lot that
adjoined the manufacturing plant area. Id. at 106-07.
51. Id. at 108.
52. See id. at 108, 112-14.
53. See id. at 112. The fundamental issue involved in this accommodation approach
was whether or not the union could effectively communicate with company employees
outside of company property. Only in those cases where the union could not effectively
reach employees away from company property could the Board compel an employer to
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facts of the case, the Court determined that usual methods of imparting
information were available to the union.5 4 Despite the fact that some

employees resided up to thirty miles away from the manufacturing plant,
the Court nevertheless found them to be within reasonable reach. 5
Therefore, the Court held that the employer met the two-pronged test

and was not required to5 6allow the union use of its private property for
organizational activities.
C.

Babcock & Wilcox's Progeny

In cases following Babcock & Wilcox, the Board and courts generally
denied unions access to company property, since unions were considered
to be able to communicate effectively with employees without having to
situations
trespass.5 7 An exception did exist, however, in the unusual
58

where employees lived and worked on company property.

In Hudgens v. NLRB 59 the Supreme Court invoked its Babcock & Wil-

cox precedent set forth twenty years earlier. Hudgens involved peaceful
primary economic picketing60 by striking union warehouse employees
allow the union to communicate its message on company property. Id.; see also Robert A.
Gorman, Union Access to Private Property:A Critical Assessment of Lechmere, Inc. v.
NLRB, 9 Hovsama LAB. LU. 1, 3 (1991) (analyzing the Supreme Court's holding in Babcock & Wilcox).
54. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 113. According to the Court, if the location of the
plant and the living quarters of the employees placed the employees beyond the reach of
reasonable union efforts to communicate with them, then the employer would have to
allow the union to approach his employees on his property. Id.
55. Id
56. Id. at 114.
57. See, e.g., Sabine Towing & Tkansp. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 114, 117-18 (1982) (holding
that employees were reasonably accessible to union organizers away from the employer's
private property).
58. See, e.g., Husky Oil, N.P.R. Operations, Inc. v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 643 (10th Cir.
1982) (protecting union access to a remote petroleum exploration outpost in Alaska accessible only by airplane); North Star Drilling Co., 290 N.L.R.B. 826 (1988) (holding that
barring union organizers form a self-propelled oil drilling vessel operating 24 hours a day
at various sites in the ocean and generally not open to the public was an unfair labor
practice since no reasonable alternative means of communication existed), aff'd mem., 877
F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Arpro Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 313 (1982) (ordering overnight
access for union to a seafood processing ship). See generallysupra note 54 and accompanying text. But see SCNO Barge Lines, Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. 169 (1987) (holding that, despite
the fact that employees worked on tugboats which never docked and were generally not
open to the public, reasonable means of access to the employees did exist because the
employer provided the union with employees' names and addresses and the union had had
prior success in contacting employees), review denied sub nom. National Maritime Union
v. NLRB, 867 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1989).
59. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
60. Courts and the Board make a distinction between primary and secondary picketing. Generally, primary picketing involves an appeal by a union through picketing,

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 43:279

who picketed their employer's shoe store, located inside a suburban shopping mall. 6

An administrative law judge, the Board, and the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit all reached the conclusion
that Hudgens, the owner of the shopping center at issue, had committed
an unfair labor practice by excluding the picketers.6 2 The Supreme Court
remanded the case, directing that the National Labor Relations Act was
the only criteria to be considered in determining the case.6 3 The Court
thereby reminded the Board of its responsibility to seek a proper accommodation between the property rights of the mall owner and the Section
7 rights of the employees.' Aware that in making such an accommodation the facts of each case play a vital role, the Court stated that the point
of accommodation "may fall at differing points along the spectrum depending on the nature and strength of the respective § 7 rights and prihandbilling or other means, undertaken on premises "occupied exclusively by a primary
employer." BARTOSIC & HARTLEY, 1986 ed., supra note 4, at 243. The object of primary
picketing is to interfere with the normal operations of the employer's business. LIL Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held picketing by a union to be lawful when designed to
"induce both the primary employees to strike and the employees of customers and suppliers not to cross a picket line at the primary employer's premises." Id. at 240; see Local 761,
Int'l Bhd. of Elect., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961); NLRB v.
International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951). Primary picketing should be contrasted with secondary picketing, in which the activities of a union occur on premises occupied exclusively by a secondary employer. BARTOSiC & HARTLEY, 1986 ed., supra note 4,
at 243, Basically, "[slecondary activity is the use of economic coercion by a union against
an employer or other person with which it does not directly have a labor dispute to further
its objects in a dispute with another employer, thus resulting in the extension of the dispute
beyond the immediate parties." Id at 238. Such activity is considered unlawful if the
union's object is to pressure the secondary employer into severing business ties with the
primary employer "by persuading secondary employees to strike or to refuse to handle
goods produced by, or destined for, the primary employer." Id.at 243.
61. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 507. In fact, until removed, the employees picketed directly
in front of the employer's store entrance inside the mall and also picketed the employer's
downtown warehouse where they worked. i
62. Id. at 510-11. While agreeing with the underlying findings of the administrative
law judge, the Board did depart from the judge's reasoning. The Board concluded that the
existence of an alternative means of communication with the customers and employees of
the Butler shoe store was immaterial, since the pickets were within the scope of Hudgens's
invitation to members of the public to do business at the shopping center. Id. at 511. The
court of appeals enforced the Board's cease-and-desist order against Hudgens, however,
on the basis of yet another theory involving an acknowledgment of the pickets' Section 7
rights and an evaluation of the competing constitutional and property right considerations
addressed in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 511-12.
63. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 523. The judgment was vacated by the Court, which found
that "the rights and liabilities of the parties in this case [were] dependent exclusively upon
the National Labor Relations Act." Id. at 521. The case was remanded to the Court of
Appeals, with directions to remand the case to the Board so that the case could be considered under the specific criteria delineated by the Court. Id. at 523.
64. Id. at 522.
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vate property rights asserted in any given context."6

As a result, the

Board must make the ultimate decision in reaching an accommodation."6
On remand, with the instructions from the Supreme Court, the Board

again found an unfair labor practice.67 The Board held that the mall
owner's interference with the picketing violated the NLRA on the basis
that there would exist no reasonable alternative means of communication
with the intended audience if the strikers were denied access to the mall

premises.68 In support of its holding, the Board found that requiring the
strikers to relocate to the entrances of the mall would greatly attenuate
the message, thereby making it less meaningful. 69 Furthermore, factors
such as the mall being open to the public and the existence of a broad
invitation to enter the mall property without having a specific intent to
buy weighed in favor of allowing union access. 70 The Board clearly asfrom
serted that employers would not successfully insulate themselves
71

union activities simply by moving their stores into private malls.

The Court reemphasized the threshold nature of inquiries into alterna-

tive means of communication in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego
County DistrictCouncil of Carpenters.72 There, the Court held that nonemployee union organizers would not be allowed to gain access to
property unless they could show that no other reasonable means of communicating their message to the employees was available. 73 Without such
65. Id.; see also Gorman, supra note 53.
66. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 522.
67. Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. 414 (1977).
68. Id. at 414-15. The absence of a reasonable alternative means of communication
was the primary reason that the intended audience of the pickets' was not considered a
specific group generally accessible by means other than entry onto the property. Peter J.
Ford, The NLRB, Jean Country, And Access To PrivateProperty:A ReasonableAlternative
to Reasonable Alternative Means of Communication Under Fairmont Hotel, 13 GEo. MASON U. L. Rnv. 683, 689 (1991). The Board identified the pickets' intended audience as
comprising two distinct groups:
(1) those members of the buying public who might, when seeing Butler's [shoe
store] window display inside the Mall, think of doing business with that one employer, and (2) the employees at the Butler store. Although the nonstriking employees at the Butler store were obviously a clearly defined group, the potential
customers (the more important component of the intended audience) became established as such only when individual shoppers decide to enter the store.
Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. at 416.
69. Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. at 417.
70. See Ford, supra note 68, at 689-90.
71. Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. at 418. Cf Amalgamated Food Employees Union
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308,323-25 (1968), overruled by Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
72. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
73. Id. at 205.
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a showing, a court would not need to consider balancing the competing
rights.7'
Giant Food Markets, Inc. 75 expounded upon one facet observed by the
Board as being instrumental in its Hudgens remand decision.76 The Giant
Food case emerged after a store operated by Allied Food Markets was
closed and its unionized workforce terminated.7 7 Giant Food reopened a
retail food store with a nonunion workforce in the space formerly occupied by Allied Foods.7 8 The union picketed and handbilled, urging the
public to boycott the store because the Giant Food employees had no
union representation and were receiving substandard wages and benefits. 7 9 The union refused a request to vacate the property, so the property
owners obtained a temporary restraining order limiting the union's access
to the property.80 After issuance of the temporary restraining order,
however, the union resumed picketing and handbilling at entrances and
exits to the shopping center just outside the property line."
Again the Board was required to weigh a number of factors in making
its determination and, as in Hudgens, the Board found in Giant Food that
union access should be granted.' There were several reasons for finding
in favor of union access.8 3 First, the property involved was shared by at
least one other business." More important, however, was the fact that
the union's principal intended audience was potential customers, "who
become readily identifiable only when they decide to enter the store,
which may be on impulse when they see an advertisement in the window.""5 As such, any means of communication other than direct access
to the employer's property could not be considered reasonable in light of
74. The Court reasoned that such a threshold was appropriate because "any right [that
nonemployee organizers] may have to solicit on an employer's property is a derivative of
the right of that employer's employees to exercise their organization rights effectively." Id.
at 206 n.42.
75. 241 N.L.R.B. 727 (1979), enforcement denied, 633 F.2d 18 (6th Cir. 1980).
76. Id. at 728. The Board considered the availability of reasonable alternative means
of communication with the intended audience of the pickets as a factor when making its
determination. Id. at 728-29.

77. Id. at 727, 731.
78. Id. at 727. Upon reopening, Giant Food did not employ any of the former Allied
employees. Id.

79. Id. The union's picketing and handbiUing activities took place on the sidewalk
directly in front of the Giant Food store. Id. None of the pickets was a Giant employee,
although several were former Allied Food employees. Id.
80. Id. at 731.
81. Id.

82. Id. at 727.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 728.
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its possible ineffectiveness.8 6 Therefore, the Board again found that requiring picketing and handbilling to be conducted on public property at
parking lot entrances approximately 250 feet away from the store entrances too greatly dilutes the union's message and thereby reduces its
87

meaning.

Jean Country and Brook Shopping Centers, Inc.8 8 arose nearly ten
years after the Board's decision in Hudgens. During that time frame, a
number of cases had come before the Board in which it attempted to

balance private property rights with unions' rights to undertake their activities. 89 The Board used the Jean Country decision to implement a definitive policy with respect to competing rights in access cases and thereby
returned to the asserted principles of both Babcock & Wilcox and
90

Hudgens.

Jean Country involved a retail clothing store owned and operated by a

tenant in a shopping mall. 91 The shopping mall included two large department stores and over one hundred smaller specialty stores generally
2
clustered together and grouped in aisles in the middle of the mall. 9 In
the center of one of the aisles was located the public entrance to the Jean

Country store. 93 The challenged activity involved picketing by non-employee union representatives at the entrance to the Jean Country store
inside the mall.94 The union representatives carried signs aimed at informing the public that the store employees were not represented by the
86. Id. at 729; see Ford, supra note 68, at 690-91.
87. Giant Food, 241 N.L.R.B. at 729. It was argued that the message would be diluted
because (a) another business is on the same property, and (b) the motorists entering the
parking lot from the public road would be more concerned with their safety than with
observing the union's message by reading a picket or receiving a handbill. Id. at 729.
88. 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988).
89. See, e.g., Fairmont Hotel Co., 282 N.L.R.B. 139 (1986), overruled by Jean Country,
291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988). In FairmontHotel, a plurality of the Board interpreted the holding
to mean that if the property claim asserted outweighed the Section 7 claim asserted, or vice
versa, it would not be necessary to evaluate alternative means of communications, since no
balancing of competing claims would have to be undertaken. Id. at 141-43. This applied
only when the competing claims were analyzed independently of the reasonable alternative
means of communication factor. Id. However, in Jean Country, the Board subsequently
overruled the FairmontHotel plurality's view that the alternative means of communication
factor must at times be excluded from the Board's determination of whether and how far
property rights should yield to the exercise of Section 7 rights. Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B.
at 11.
90. Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. at 11; see Ford, supra note 68, at 697; see also supra
note 37 and accompanying text.
91. Jean Country, 291 N.L.A.B. at 14.
92. Id.
93. 1M
94. Id. at 11.
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union and therefore, customers should not patronize Jean Country. 95
The union's goal was to persuade customers to shop at other stores in the
mall whose employees were represented by the union.9 6 The attempted
picketing resulted in the mall owner and Jean Country having the police
97
remove the pickets from the premises.
In the Jean Country ruling, the Board again changed its standard for
access cases. 98 Based upon Supreme Court precedent, the Board declared that in all access cases, the degree to which Section 7 rights are
impaired through denial of access should be balanced against the degree
to which private property rights are impaired if access is granted.99 In
addition, the availability of reasonable alternative means of communication was to be considered "especially significant" in this balancing
process.1 00
Under the new analysis, the Board found the organizational picketing
of the union designed to discourage customers from shopping at Jean
Country to be within the protection of Section 7 rights, although admittedly on the weaker end of the "'spectrum"' of Section 7 rights.' 0 1 In so
finding, the Board examined the possibility of the union reaching customers in a nontrespassory manner.'0 This alternative, however, was quickly
dismissed by the Board. °" The Board considered it unreasonable to require the union to undertake a mass media campaign, particularly since
the union would thereby incur great costs and its message would be removed from the "situs."' 1 Moreover, according to the Board, the union
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13-14.

99. Id. at 14. The Board applied this approach to a number of cases after Jean Country. See, e.g., Target Stores, 300 N.L.R.B. 964 (1990) (holding that a lessee in a shopping
mall had a weaker property interest due to lack of notice restricting access and finding that
other means of communication would impose too great a danger or result in the dilution of
the union's message); Wegmans Food Mkts., Inc., 300 N.L.R.B. 868, 869-71 (1990) (applying the Jean Country balancing approach and holding that the supermarket, located in a

strip mall, had a weaker property interest because of the public accessibility, the fact that
the supermarket previously permitted political campaigning on the property, and the fact
that picket signs would be dangerous and inefficacious).
100. Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. at 14.
101. Id. at 17, 18.
102. Id. at 18.

103. Id. at 18-19.
104. Id. at 18 n.18. Specifically, the Board declared that "it will be an exceptional case
where mass media constitute reasonable alternatives." Id. Delivering the union's message
via mass media, i.e., television, radio, newspapers, or mass mailings, removes the message
from the situs of the labor dispute and, as a result, potential customers approaching the
store may not be aware of the union's efforts. Id.

1993]

Consumer Picketing and Impulse Buying

message could not be conveyed from the public entrances of the mal.1 "5
This alternative would not only vitiate the union message,10 6 but would

also not allow the union effectively to reach "impulse" shoppers." ° Thus,
the only way for the union to identify and communicate with potential

customers would be to picket closer to the store.108 The Board ruling
entitled the union representatives to picket in the mall.1"9 In so ruling,
the Board determined that the private property rights would not be
meaningfully impaired and, in addition, that the union's Section 7 right
would be protected by allowing entry onto mall property. 110
Through January 1, 1991, the Board decided twenty-six cases in which
the Jean Country analytical approach was applied.1 11 In a majority of
these cases, the Board determined that the impracticability of alternative
means of communication outweighed the private property interests and
105. Id. at 18. The Board expressed concern that mall patrons may, on exposure to the
union's activities, presume the entire shopping center to be involved in a labor dispute and
therefore turn away. I& The Board also considered the large number of stores in the mall
and the "distinct likelihood of confusion [on the part of consumers] concerning which store
had been identified on the picket sign." Id. The Board feared that stores other than Jean
Country could thereby lose patronage. Id.
106. Id. at 18. The grounds for finding that the union message would be diluted if
conveyed at the public entrances of the mall were threefold: [1] the "shear physical distance" from the mall entrances to the entrance of Jean Country were considered too great,
[2] there were over 100 other stores located within the mall, and [3] with 10,000 to 20,000
people entering the mall at the eight public entrances each day, this number was simply too
high for the union to deliver an effective message, except at the Jean Country store entrance. Id. These three factors justified the Board's finding that nontrespassory alternative means of communication would be unreasonable.
107. The "impulse" buyer theory was a pivotal factor in the Board's 1977 Scott Hudgens
remand decision. See id.; see also Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. 414 (1977). In Scott
Hudgens, the Board noted that potential customers, an important component of the picketers' intended audience, "became established as such only when individual shoppers decide to enter the store." Id. at 416. Furthermore, the Board averred that "the fact that
many people become members of the pickets' intended audience on impulse... weigh[s]
against requiring the pickets to remove to public property, or even to the sidewalks surrounding the Mall." Id. at 417; see infra text accompanying notes 168-83 (discussing impulse buying); see also supra text accompanying notes 59-71 (discussing the Hudgens
decision).
108. Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. at 18; see Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. at 416, 417.
109. Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. at 19. The Board stated that the "Section 7 right [of
the union] outweighed the Respondents' [Jean Country] right to the privacy of the mall
property in this particular context, and the union was entitled to engage in the picketing
that it conducted in front of the Jean Country store." Id. Furthermore, the Board concluded that the "Respondents' refusal to permit the Union's picketing and their subsequent use of the police to threaten the pickets with arrest for trespass violated Section
8(a)(1) of the [National Labor Relations] Act." Id.
110. Id.
111. See Ford, supra note 68, at 700.
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thereby provided for union access onto the private property. 1 2 This se-

ries of Board decisions, coupled with the Supreme Court's decisions in
Babcock & Wilcox,"

3

Sears, Roebuck & Co.," 4 and Hudgens,115

established a standard for the accommodation of competing rights and
the foundational threshold analysis for the court in Lechmere Inc. v.
NLRB.
II.

16

LECHMERE APPLIED IN A DIFFERENT FACrUAL SITUATION

A.

Consumers as the Target Audience

The Supreme Court's holding in Lechmere made it clear that where
unions are engaged in organizational activities, their access to private
property will depend on a multitude of factors. 117 However, the Supreme
112. See, e.g., Wegman's Food Mkts., Inc., 300 N.L.R.B. 868 (1990) (permitting informational handbilling on the sidewalk, considered private property, by the store entrance);
Sparks Nugget, Inc., 298 N.L.R.B. 524 (1990) (upholding the union's right to picket and
handbill at the rear customer entrance to the hotel/casino, finding that union could not
reasonably distribute handbills to customers arriving on tour buses, and those customers
would not likely see picket signs from the bus), enforcement granted in partand denied in
part, 968 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1992); Sentry Mkts., Inc., 296 N.L.R.B. 40 (1989) (holding that
picketing and handbilling on the sidewalk near the store entrance should be allowed for a
number of reasons, including: (a) handbilling and picketing on public property near the
parking lot entrance would be ineffective and unsafe, (b) media advertising would move
the union's message too 'far in time and distance from the point of purchase, and (c) inclement weather and possible community crime would make hand delivery of the message
to homes ineffective), review denied, enforcement granted, 914 F.2d 113 (7th Cir. 1990);
Granco, Inc., 294 N.L.R.B. 173 (1989) (holding that picketing and handbilling at the store
entrance and in the parking lot were allowed as no reasonable alternative means of communication existed); Dolgin's, 293 N.L.R.B. 845 (1989) (allowing union access to several
retail store entrances for picketing and handbilling purposes); Mountain Country Food
Store, Inc., 292 N.L.R.B. 967 (1989) (allowing handbilling in front of retail grocery stores),
enforcement denied, 931 F.2d 21 (8th Cir. 1991); Karatjas Family Lockport Corp., 292
N.L.R.B. 953 (1989) (allowing informational picketing and handbilling on the sidewalk by
the store entrance); Target Stores, 292 N.L.R.B. 933 (1989) (providing a union with access
to a store entrance and defining the employer's property rights as weak); D'Alessandro's,
Inc., 292 N.L.R.B. 81 (1988) (holding that picketing and handbilling customers at store
entrances urging them to boycott the establishment was the only reasonable means of communication). But cf. Red Food Stores, Inc., 296 N.L.R.B. 450 (1989) (refusing union access
to grocery stores for purposes of picketing and handbilling); Richway, 294 N.L.R.B. 650
(1989) (denying union access to retail stores to protest use of nonunion contractors); Tecumseh Foodland, 294 N.L.R.B. 486 (1989) (holding that a union does not have the right to
obstruct access to a retail store).
113. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
114. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
115. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
116. 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
117. See id. at 848-50. The most important factor set forth by the Court focuses on the
feasibility of reasonable attempts at communicating with employees. See supra text accompanying notes 31-34.
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Court failed to address the applicability of the Lechmere formula in cases
where a union pickets an employer to relay a given message to potential
customers. The picketing and handbilling in such situations is typically
aimed at protesting the targeted store's failure to meet the union's "area
standards."11 Instead, the Supreme Court focused on nonemployee
union efforts aimed at reaching employees rather than customers." 9
B. The History and Progressionof Consumer Picketing Cases

In Hudgens v. NLRB, 20 employees were striking and picketing a shoe
store located within a shopping mall. 2 ' The union pickets aimed to discourage customers, their principal target audience, from patronizing the
shoe store. 122 However, the mall owner forbade picketing in front of the
store entrance. 123 On remand from the Supreme Court, 2 4 the Board
held that the mall owner's interference with the picketing violated the

NLRA.' 2 Specifically, the Board found that without access to the mall
premises, the union members would have no reasonable alternative
means of communication with their intended audience.126 More importantly, the intended audience was not a specific group but rather, members of the buying public who were identifiable only as they were about
to enter the respective store.' 27
In Giant Food Markets, Inc.,'28 as in the Board's Hudgens v. NLRB

remand decision, Scott Hudgens,129 consumers were again the union's
118. See, e.g., Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11, 12 (1988). Unions generally believe that
stores not complying with union area standards are a threat to the wages, hours and working conditions established by the union. Id. at 15.
119. See Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 848-50.
120. 424 U.S. 507 (1976). Although the case made it to the Supreme Court, it was
ultimately remanded to the Board with instructions to consider the issues solely under the
National Labor Relations Act criteria. Id. at 521-23; Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. 414
(1977).
121. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 507.
122. See id. at 509 (noting that striking warehouse employees picketed not only the
warehouse, but also the retail outlets).
123. Id.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 63-71. The Board's decision after remand was
issued as Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. at 414. The Supreme Court had remanded the case
to the court appeals, directing it to further remand the case to the NLRB. The remand
order directed the Board to consider exclusively the rights and liabilities of the parties to
the case under the statutory criteria of the NLRA, and not to measure these rights and
liabilities under a First Amendment standard. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 523.
125. Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. at 414.
126. Id. at 417.
127. Id. at 416.
128. 241 N.L.R.B. 727 (1979), remanded, 633 F.2d 18 (6th Cir. 1980).
129. 230 N.L.R.B. at 414.
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principal intended audience. 130 The union was picketing the public, encouraging them to boycott the store.131 Again, the Board found that this
audience became readily identifiable only after deciding to enter the
store which, according to the Board, "may be on impulse when they see
an advertisement in the window. '132 The Board considered a number of
factors before ultimately determining that the balance weighed in favor
of the union.1 33 The Board held that any other means of communication
besides direct access to the employer's property could not be considered
"'reasonable"' when assessing the possible effectiveness of the
134
message.
Seattle-FirstNational Bank135 provided the Board with another opportunity to address the issue of consumer picketing. The case involved
striking employees of a restaurant located on one floor of an office building.'3 6 The employees picketed and handbilled in the foyer of the restaurant until they were ordered to leave the building.'3 7 In again applying a
balancing approach, the Board ruled that the strikers' Section 7 rights
outweighed the owner's property rights. 13 8 The Board reasoned that the
union's message could be effectively communicated only if the pickets
had access to the employer's property. 139 According to the Board, restaurant customers became identifiable only as they entered the restaurant, and therefore, access to the restaurant entrance was essential to
4
deliver the message to the intended audience.1 0
Finally, in Montgomery Ward & Co.,' the Board again found that
striking employees' Section 7 rights outweighed private property interests
130.
131.
132.
133.

241 N.L.R.B. at 728.
Id. at 727.
Id. at 728.
Id. at 727-29.

134. Id. at 729. Reasoning that the dilution of the union's message was too severe if not
delivered by direct access, the Board found no justification for requiring the picketing and
handbilling to be conducted on public property at parking lot entrances approximately 250

feet from the store entrance. Id.
135. 243 N.L.R.B. 898 (1979), remanded, 651 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1980).
136. Id. at 898. The Mirabeau restaurant shared the 46th floor of the Seattle-First National Bank Building with a stock brokerage firm. Id. However, the restaurant exclusively
controlled the 46th floor foyer. Id
137. Id. In addition to having pickets distributing leaflets in the foyer adjoining the
Mirabeau restaurant, the union pursued its picketing and handbilling efforts on public sidewalks near each one of the building's entrances and exits, advising potential restaurant
customers of the labor dispute. Id.
138. Id. at 899.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 265 N.L.R.B. 60 (1982).
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of the employer. 4 2 The union was conducting consumer handbilling to
urge customers not to buy the primary employer's products. 14 3 The
Board held that Montgomery Ward unacceptably diluted the effect of
the union's message by attempting to limit the handbilling to specific
144

areas.

In these consumer picketing cases, the Board applied the Babcock &
Wilcox accommodation analysis.1 45 The Court in Lechmere, however, indicated that the alternative means of communication test may no longer
hinge upon a comparative analysis of the nature of the union's message

and the strength of the competing Section 7 right. 46 Rather, with respect
142. Id.
143. I. According to the Board, "[t]he union had a right to handbill consumers on
[Montgomery Ward's] property, and to do so effectively, while simultaneously accommodating and disturbing as little as possible [Montgomery Ward's) private property rights."
Id.; see also Seattle-FirstNational Bank, 243 N.L.R.B. at 898 (finding that restricting striking employees to the sidewalk, while the object of the strike was located on the forty-sixth
floor, excessively hindered the strikers' ability to deliver their message to the intended
audience); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (stating that the union's message was
diluted where striking pickets were required to remain approximately three hundred feet
from the store entrance).
144. Montgomery Ward & Co., 265 N.L.R.B. at 60. The Board reasoned that requiring
the union to "handbill from the curb, driveway entrances, or anywhere else not on its
property substantially diluted and restricted [the union's] Section 7 right, since, like picketing, the effectiveness of handbilling depends on its location." Id.; see also United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492 (1964).
145. See supra note 37 and accompanying text; see also Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 522. In
Hudgens, the Court again reiterated the accommodation test of Babcock & Wilcox,
writing:
The Babcock & Wilcox opinion established the basic objective under the Act:
accommodation of § 7 rights and private property rights "with as little destruction
of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other." The locus of that
accommodation, however, may fall at differing points along the spectrum depending on the nature and strength of the respective § 7 rights and private property
rights asserted in any given context.
Id. (quoting NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105,112 (1956)) (footnote omitted).
A number of consumer picketing cases have arisen in recent years as well. See, e.g.,
Dillard's, Inc., 305 N.L.R.B. 1102 (1992) (involving a handbilling campaign aimed at dissuading the public from shopping at certain stores); JMB Properties Co., 305 N.L.R.B. 978
(1991) (involving union handbilling at the interior mall entrance of a retail store); Makro,
Inc., 305 N.L.R.B. 663 (1991) (involving union picketing at retail store's entrance and exit);
Oakland Mall, Ltd., 304 N.L.R.B. 832, (1991) (involving picketing and handbilling of customers of a retail store at the retail store's mall entrances); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 304
N.L.R.B. 58 (1991) (involving picketing in front of auto centers located in shopping centers); Target Stores, 300 N.L.R.B. 964 (1990) (involving the handbilling of stores located
within a shopping mall); Red Food Stores, Inc., 296 N.L.R.B. 450 (1989) (involving the
picketing of stores located in strip malls). In these cases, however, the Board applied the
Jean Country analysis instead of the Babcock & Wilcox test. See supra notes 88-110 and
accompanying text.
146. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 848 (1992).
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to union picketing of employees, Lechmere demonstrates that the critical
inquiry is whether unions are able to reach their intended audience away
from an employer's private property.1 47
III.

LECHMEReS ROLE IN UNION AcCESs

A.

DIsPuTEs

The Broad Holding

The conflict involved in Lechmere encompasses a myriad of issues,
many of which have been comprehensively addressed in existing articles
and scholastic works.1 48 Under the Lechmere holding, unions will have a
more difficult time trying to prevail when private property rights clash
with employees' statutory rights to organize.149 The Lechmere standard
147. Id.

148. See, e.g., Leonard Bierman, Justice Thomas and Lechmere, Inc., v. NLRB: A Reply
To Professor Robert A. Gorman, 10 HoFsTRA LAB. LJ. 299, 301 (1992) (discussing the
limitations of the Lechmere decision in the context of rules governing union organizing);
Clifford R. Oviatt, Jr., Recent Developments At The National Labor Relations Board, 22
STETSON L. REv. 115, 127-32 (1992) (providing a discussion of Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,
and identifying a number of unanswered questions raised by the case); Ford, supra note 68
(providing a thorough review of pre-Lechmere developments).
Board member Clifford Oviatt sees the courts as becoming increasingly likely to set
aside agency conclusions and substitute their own policy judgments. NLRB Member Oviatt
Scores Court For Hostility To Agency Fact-Finding,[Current Developments] Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 156, at A-8 (Aug. 12, 1992). He traces an increasing unwillingness in the
courts to defer to the Board's expertise in labor relations. Id. This downward trend, in his
opinion, has been accelerated by the Supreme Court's holding in Lechmere, where the
Court said that it was not bound by the NLRB's factual finding that nonemployee organizers lacked reasonable access to the employees outside of the shopping center. Id.; see
also Gorman, supra note 53 (providing a detailed assessment of Lechmere); Hartley, supra
note 10, at 528-29 (addressing several key issues arising out of the Court's Lechmere decision and making insightful observations regarding post-Lechmere ramifications); NLRB
Member Oviatt Says Lechmere Creates Presumption Against Union Access, [Current Developments] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at A-8 (Feb. 3, 1992); Employers and Unions
Foresee More Costly Organizing Tactics, [Current Developments] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 19, at A-15 (Jan. 29, 1992) [hereinafter More Costly Organizing];Frederic M. Biddle,
Court Backs Lechmere in Dispute with Union, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 28, 1992, at 37; Linda
Greenhouse, Votes to Spare; Court Serves Notice of its Transformation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,
1992, § 4, at 3; Mark Silk, Thomas Proves to be Predictable,ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 30,
1992, at All.
149. Lechmere to Make Organizing More Difficult, 140 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) at 218-19
(June 15, 1992) [hereinafter Organizing More Difficult] (pointing out that unions will have
a "'tough row to hoe"' when trying to show a lack of reasonable alternative means of
communication to contact their target audience) (quoting NLRB board member's chief
counsel); see NLRB's Hunter Discusses Issues Left Open by Lechmere Decision, [Current
Developments] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at A-3 (Feb. 9, 1993) (quoting NLRB General Counsel as stating: "'Obviously, Lechmere has impacted a union's ability to go onto
private property to try to organize employees."'); Organizing Tactics Shift in Wake of
Lechmere Holding, 139 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 102 (Feb. 3, 1992) [hereinafter Tactics Shift]
("Union and management practitioners agreed that organizing will be more difficult and
more expensive in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Lechmere v. NLRB.").
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articulated a general rule disallowing union business agents who are not

employees from entering an employer's private property for the purpose
of union organizational activities.15 0 In particular, the Lechmere holding
decisively repudiated Jean Country and subsequent cases with respect to

organizing efforts on the part of nonemployee union representatives and
union organizers who attempt to come onto private property generally
open to the public at large, such as shopping malls. 151
Pursuant to Lechmere, the only factor to be considered when union

organizers attempt to enter private property for the purpose of organizing will be the availability of other reasonable alternative means to contact employees."5 2 Under Justice Thomas' opinion, such an exception will
only exist in cases where the work site is geographically isolated and the

15 3
union is only able to communicate with prospective members at work.
As a result, unions will find it increasingly difficult to convince courts that

they lacked a reasonable alternative means to contact employees who are
the target of their organizing drive.15 4 Nonetheless, by recognizing possible exceptions to its general rule, Lechmere did not abandon completely
the notion that the effectiveness of the resulting communication is a relevant consideration.1 55
150. OrganizingMore Difficult, supra note 149, at 218-20; see Tactics Shift, supra note

149, at 102. "Mona Zeiberg of the National Chamber Litigation Center [has] hailed the
[Lechmere] decision as an important victory for business that secures private property
rights and 'assures that union organizers are not able to disrupt normal business activity
when they have other reasonable means of contacting employees."' Id.
151. See Gorman, supra note 53, at 2. It is important to note that Lechmere and Jean
Country were decided in light of differing factual circumstances. In Jean Country, the
union tried to reach customers of the store, while in Lechmere, the union representatives
tried to reach employees of the store to offer them membership in the union. Id. at 7; see
also Strip Malls: Plain But Powerful, in AmER1cAN DEMOoRAPHICS, Oct. 1991, at 48. In
1990, strip malls accounted for 87% of all shopping malls and 51% of total shopping center
retail sales. Id.
152. See OrganizingMore Difficult, supra note 149, at 218-19.
153. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 849 (1992); see OrganizingMore Difficult,
supra note 149, at 218-19; see also More Costly OrganizingTactics Predicted, 139 Lab. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) 113-15 (Feb. 3, 1992) [hereinafter More Costly OrganizingTactics]. According to Rosemary Collyer of Crowell & Mooring, the Court has opted for a "'black and
white' rule with a 'clean bright line,"' in Lechmere, stating further that the Court may be
more willing to "'find clarity rather than ambiguity in the law."' Id.
154. Organizing More Difficult, supra note 149, at 218-20.
155. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 849; see Hartley, supra note 10, at 529-30; see also More
Costly Organizing Tactics, supra note 153, at 113-14. Former NLRB General Counsel
Rosemary Collyer stated that the Supreme Court may have left the door open for new
litigation to assess when a rare exception will apply to permit access onto private property
by union organizers. Furthermore, according to Collyer, the Court's ruling seems to suggest that access by radio, television and newspapers might be adequate. Id.
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B. Application of the Lechmere Reasoning

In rendering the Lechmere decision, the Court revisited its holding in
Babcock & Wilcox. Although the majority indicated its preference for

adhering to the rule of Babcock & Wilcox, it ignored the authority and
responsibility that federal agencies, such as the NLRB, traditionally receive when faced with the task of interpreting and applying a governing
statute to specific factual circumstances.15 6 In particular, under the holdings of Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB 1 57 and Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
156. See Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 845-47; Gorman, supra note 53, at 2. The Supreme
Court majority held that Lechmere could be perfectly addressed through the Babcock &
Wilcox decision. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 845-47; see also Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759
(1991) (holding that the interpretation of an authorizing statute by the agency charged with
administering it shall be accorded substantial deference by the courts); Chevron, U.S.A,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
The Chevron doctrine, stemming from the 1984 Supreme Court decision, specifically
addresses the issue of judicial deference to an agency's statutory interpretation. The doctrine adheres to the proposition that if an agency administrator has made a reasonable
interpretation of a statutory provision, a court may not substitute its own construction of
the statutory provision for that of the agency administrator. Id. at 844. Furthermore, the
Chevron doctrine provides that an agency's construction of a statute need not be the only
permissible adaptation in order to uphold the construction, nor must it be "the reading the
court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding. Id. at
843 n.11; see also Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 84748; Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1767.
Although Justice Thomas did acknowledge the Board's unique position in interpreting
the NLRA by stating that "[l]ike other administrative agencies, the NLRB is entitled to
judicial deference when it interprets an ambiguous provision of a statute that it administers," Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 847, ultimately the Court refrained from granting such deference. Id.; see also NLRB v. Food & Commercial Workers Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123
(1987). Instead, Justice Thomas argued that the Chevron standard of deference to an
agency's statutory interpretation did not apply in Lechmere because the employees could
learn of the union's message through non-trespassory means of communications and therefore, no need existed to grant nonemployee union organizers access to company property.
Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 847-48.
157. 340 U.S. 474 (1951). Justice Frankfurter observed that "canvassing 'the whole record' in order to ascertain substantiality does not furnish a calculus of value by which a
reviewing court can assess the evidence." Id. at 488. Furthermore, Justice Frankfurter
opined that the Board's findings of fact could only be set aside when the record "clearly
precludes the Board's decision from being justified by a fair estimate of the worth of the
testimony of witnesses or [the Board's] informed judgment on matters within its special
competence or both." Id. at 490. See Clifford R. Oviatt, Jr., Judicial Second-Guessing and
the National Labor Relations Board: What Has Happened to Chevron and Universal Camera After Lechmere, Address Before the Labor Law Section of the American Bar Association (Aug. 11, 1992), in 156 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 156, at H-i (Aug. 12, 1992). Board
member Oviatt noted his agreement with the underlying result in Lechmere, but disagreed

with the Court's analysis that it was not bound by the agency's finding of fact that the nonemployee organizers did not have reasonable access to the employees away from the shopping center. Oviatt also noted an increased willingness on the part of some circuit courts in
the months following the Lechmere decision to reverse the Board's factual findings, usually
without remand, despite the presence of substantial evidence on the record as a whole to
warrant affirmance. Id. In addition, Oviatt noted an increased willingness to "reject out-
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NaturalResources Defense Council,158 the Court should have deferred to
the Board's factual finding that the nonemployee union organizers did
not have reasonable access to the employees away from the mall area.
The Court unequivocally repudiated the Board's attempt to find an accommodation between the competing interests of nonemployee organizers and owners of private property, particularly where alternate
means of contacting employees exist.159 Thus, the Court posited that the

dynamics of a confrontation over competing Section 7 rights are of little
importance under the single-factor Babcock & Wilcox analysis.1 60 In doing so, the Court failed to distinguish between a confrontation on private
property where public access is limited and one where public access is
abundant. 161
By ignoring the important distinction in the nature of an employer's
property which must be considered in union access cases, the Court applied an extremely narrow interpretation of the Babcock & Wilcox decision.162 As discussed in the dissenting opinion of Justice White, the
language of Babcock & Wilcox seems to authorize the Board to make an
"accommodation" of the respective Section 7 rights and property interests of the parties. 63 In addition to simply conferring authority to make
an accommodation, Justice White argued that Babcock & Wilcox also allows the Board to consider factors beyond nontrespassory access to workers in making the accommodation.16
Nonetheless, the majority construed the Babcock & Wilcox approach
as providing that the accommodation of private property interests is not
dependent on public accessibility to the property. 65 According to the
majority, the pivotal factor in determining the viability of alternative
of-hand the Board's reasonable construction of the statute with nary a nod to Chevron, and
without remand to the [B]oard." Id. Cf. Courts Increasingly Reject NLRB Fact-Finding,
140 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 495-96 (Aug. 17, 1992). Management attorney Robert P. Roy
insisted that the traditional standard of review enunciated in Universal Camera and Chevron remains strong and operative. According to Roy, even under Lechmere, deference will
be granted to the agency when it is due. Id.
158. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
159. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 849.
160. See id. at 848-50.
161. For example, a case where the Section 7 organizing activities are taking place on
the private property of a plant or work site isolated from the public would be no different
than a case in which the private property is a retail establishment where the public has
unfettered access to the stores and parking facilities.
162. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 848-49.
163. 1& at 851.
164. Id. at 851-52.
165. Id. at 848. The Court declared that in the course of a union's reasonable attempt
to communicate with its target audience, "'reasonable"' connotes "nothing more than a
commonsense recognition that unions need not engage in extraordinary feats to communi-
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means of communication is the percentage of workers who can be contacted away from the company's private property. 166 No longer will the
Court consider the nature or ardor of the union's message, or even the
basis of the Section 7 right.167
IV.

CONSUMER PICKETING, IMPULSE BUYING & LECHMERE

A.

The Theory of "Impulse Buying"

The Board's Scott Hudgens168 decision on remand was the first opinion
to refer to the theory of "impulse buying" as a legitimate consideration in
evaluating union tactics. The Board considered the theory in deciding
whether unions have reasonable alternative means of reaching consumers
where shopping center property is made unavailable to them for communication purposes. 69 The Board concluded that many people become
members of the pickets' audience on impulse, and that this weighed
against requiring the pickets to move from the store entrance to public
property or sidewalks surrounding the mall. 70
1.

Marketing Studies Supporting "Impulse Buying" Phenomenon

The phenomenon of impulse buying is well established consumer behavior.17 1 The field of marketing has defined two types of consumers:
personal (or ultimate) consumers, who buy goods and services for their
own use; and organizational consumers, who buy products, equipment,
and services for profit or non-profit organizations. 17 2 Regardless of the
consumer's purpose, every consumer goes through a decisional process
when buying a product or service. 73 Often, this process is subconscious,
cate with inaccessible employees-not an endorsement of the view (which we expressly
rejected) that the Act protects 'reasonable' trespasses." Id
166. Id. at 849.
167. According to Max Zimny of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union,
the Court has effectively found "'a way of amending the National Labor Relations Act
without going to Congress."' More Costly Organizing Tactics, supra note 153, at 114.
168. 230 N.L.R.B. 414 (1977).
169. Id. at 417.
170. Id. (emphasis added).
171. Impulse buying is widely defined as consumer purchases done substantially at the
point of purchase. Such purchases are usually of nonessential items although essential
goods are also subject to impulse buying. See DAVID M. BROWNSTONE ET AL., THE VNR
DICrIONARY OF BUSINESS AND FINANCE 139 (1980); see infra notes 172-78 and accompa-

nying text.
172. LEON G. SCHrFFMAN & LESLIE L. KANUK, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 27-28 (3d ed.
1987).
173. JOEL R. EVANS & BARRY BERMAN, MARKETING 169 (2d ed. 1985); see also JAMES
F. ENGEL ET AL., CONSUMER BEHAVIOR (1968); JOHN A. HOWARD & JAGDISH N. SETH,
THE THEORY OF BUYER BEHAVIOR (1969); FiRNCF.sco NICOSIA, CONSUMER DEcisiON
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and the consumer is not aware of its occurrence. 174 As a result, much1of a
consumer's subsequent purchase behavior is hidden or unconscious. "
Consumer product vendors refer to the consumer's unconscious behavior as "point-of-purchase" impulse buying.17 6 Impulse buying has caused

in-store marketing to become an extremely important concept among advertisers.1 77 Market studies have shown that in-store media and displays
PROCESSES (1966); A. COSKJ N SAMU, RETAIL MARKETING STRATEoY (1989); Irving
Crespi, General Concepts, in HANDBOOK OF MARKETING RESEARCH 3-3 (Robert Ferber
ed., 1974); Robert W. Pratt Jr., MeasuringPurchaseBehavior, in HANDBOOK OF MARKETiNG RESEARCH, supra, at 3-126. An important element of the decisional process are the
inner conditions that motivate buying behavior. Id. at 137. Formally referred to as "intervening variables" by psychologists, these continuously changing inner conditions are a part
of the individual consumer's inward psychic experience. Id. As such, the intervening variables supply the psychological framework within which the consumer organizes and interprets perceived environmental stimuli. Id. The consumer's organization and interpretation
process subsequently leads to overt behavior, i.e., the purchase. Id. Intervening variables
include motives, beliefs, assumptions, prejudices, attitudes, aspirations, feelings, emotions,
expectations, and social values. Id.
174. EVANs & BERMAN, supra note 173, at 171. The consumer decision process consists
of six steps: stimulus, problem awareness, information search, evaluation of alternatives,
purchase, and postpurchase behavior. Id. at 172.
175. Id. at 171.
176. Suzi Fucini, The ABCs of P-O-P,U.S. DISTRIBUTION J., June 15,1991, at 31. Point
of purchase impulse buying generally encompasses impulse purchases made at the actual
point of sale, for example, a purchase made as a result of a display within the store.
According to some studies, two-thirds of all consumer buying decisions are now being
made in the store. Ld.; see Pete Hisey, Marketing Support for Lifestyle Merchandising;K
Mart's Fresh New Face, DiscouNT STORE NEWS, Dec. 17, 1990, at 107. The goal is to
maximize impulse sales once customers have been drawn in, since about 70% of sales are
impulse purchases. Id. Specific-use items, which include those items having a specific application or solving a specific problem, are commonly purchased on impulse by a consumer
who suddenly realizes the benefit of such an item. WEEKLY HoM FuRNISHING NEwSPAPER, July 19, 1993, at 43. Studies have also shown that drugstore shoppers, for example,
make approximately 60% of their final purchase decisions after entering the store. EvANs
& BERMAN, supra note 173, at 171. Research has shown clothing to be the single most
popular impulse purchase. Chris Burritt, Business Report: On Retailing, THE ATLANTA J.
& CONST., Oct. 26, 1991, at C2. According to Sharon Beatty, an associate professor at the
University of Alabama, shoppers who enter a store in an upbeat mood do more impulse
buying than those who go shopping in a neutral or bad mood. Id. Other high impulse
purchase items include kitchen gadgets, a category "steered by an impulse buying figure of
at least 80 percent." Cliff Coady, Showing Resiliency in a Recession, THE WEEKLY HOME
FURNISHmGS NEWSPAPER, Feb. 3, 1992, at S3. Some of the other more popular products
for impulse purchases include personal care items, magazines, snack foods, hardware, cosmetics, accessories, nonalcoholic beverages, jewelry, books, stationery and automotive supplies. See Pilot Study Finds Final Product Choice Usually Made in Store, MARKETING
NEWS, Aug. 6, 1982, at 5. In contrast, items for which specific buying plans are made in
advance include prescriptions, photographic equipment, tobacco and alcohol, and nonprescription drugs. Id. Therefore, these items are less affected by store displays, advertisements and coupons. EVANS & BERMAN, supra note 173, at 171.
177. Barbara A. Washington, In-Store Advertising Grabs Customer PurseStrings, KAN.
SAS CITY Bus. J., Sept. 27, 1991, § 1, at 19. Donnelly Marketing, a New York firm, re-
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influence shopping decisions and lengthen the time consumers spend in a
store. 78

2. The Relevance of Impulse Buying Marketing Data to Unions
The wealth of available data validating the theory of consumer impulse

buying serves to strengthen a union's effort to gain access to shopping
center property. 179 Since market data conclusively shows that advertisements, particularly in-store media advertisements and window
displays, 18 0 have a substantial impact on the purchasing behavior of consumers, a union could use this information to establish an empirical argument for access to consumers.' 8 ' The union's proposition would center

around the fact that the effective ability to convey its message to consumers is directly linked to the point at which consumers identify the
advertisements.'8 2 This, in turn, strengthens a demand by union representatives to be allowed access as close to the point of purchase as
possible.'

83

ported that 35% of all consumer promotion dollars were spent in-store in 1990, a figure
that nearly doubles that same report for 1982. Id. Displaying an item in a supermarket
aisle is recognized as promoting impulse buying. Glyn Snyder, Shedding Light on Bulb
Sales, PROGRESSIVE GROCER, June, 1993, at 117. In further recognition of impulse buying,
bakery departments are now using clear dome packaging to stack goods. As a result, more
shoppers are inspired to make impulse purchases from self-service product displays. Jeff
Hirchfield, Domes Stack Up: Bakery Departments are Using Clear Dome Packaging to
Stock Goods-And Shopper are Responding, SUPERMARKET NEWS, June 7, 1993, at 47.
178. Washington, supra note 177, at 19.
179. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text; see also Scott Hudgens, 230
N.L.R.B. 414, 416 (1977) (evidencing judicial recognition of the impulse buying theory in
the Board's description of the picket's intended audience being, in part, "members of the
buying public who might, when seeing [the store's] window display inside the Mall, think of
doing business with that one employer"); supra text accompanying notes 59-108. The consumer electronics industry is one of many to acknowledge the significant impact impulse
purchases are having on business. See Appreciating Remote Controls' Complexity,
WEEKLY HOME FURNISHING NEWSPAPER, May 31, 1993, at S10.
180. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying
note 177.
181. A union could show the need to reach consumers at the point of purchase based
on figures compiled by various market sectors. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying
text.
182. The validity of this proposition stems from market research proving that consumers only become identifiable once they have decided to make a purchase, often times on
impulse. See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
183. Following from marketing data, union organizers trying to get a message across to
consumers will be most effective if the message is displayed as close to the store as possible. See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
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B. Lechmere's Impact
Lechmere establishes the general principle to be applied when dealing
with union access to private property.1 4 This principle makes it clear
that nonemployee union representatives will be granted access to an employer's private property only by demonstrating the unavailability of a
reasonable alternative means of contacting their target audience.18s Also
to be considered, however, is that the typical labor-management scenario
resulting in union picketing and handbilling focuses on communicating
1 86
with potential consumers.
As discussed above, Lechmere reasons that a union is entitled to rea187
sonably effective means of communication with its targeted audience.
Accordingly, the reality of consumer impulse buying may require union
access to private property because it is virtually impossible to identify in
advance who will become a consumer."" 8 Typically, a person's presence
at an employer's place of business provides the only evidence of the person's consumer status. The consumer's presence at an employer's place
of business by itself manifests an intention to undertake a business trans184. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841,850 (1992) ("Access to employees, not
success in winning them over, is the critical issue ... in determining whether reasonable
access exists.").
185. See supra text accompanying notes 155-67. What is less clear, however, is how the
Court would respond to an economic strike where the union already represents the employees, and rather than communicating with the employees, seeks to contact potential
consumers. The extreme interpretation would be to construe Lechmere as not permitting
union access at all when dealing with a case outside the realm of union access to employees. However, complete exclusion by the courts is simply not a viable solution to this issue
since such judicial action would be inapposite to the purpose and ideals of Section 7 of the
NLRA.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 120-47; see also NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable
Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760,377 U.S. 58 (1964) (holding that striking union members could conduct a consumer boycott of their employer's products by picketing and
handbilling at markets selling the products). The other possibility is that a union may be
protesting area standards, thereby attempting to persuade consumers not to patronize a
particular establishment. See, e.g., Makro, Inc., 305 N.L.R.B. 663 (1991) (involving union
picketing designed to inform customers that non-union employees were jeopardizing union
wages and benefits); Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988) (involving union picketing
aimed at informing consumers of the threat to union wages, hours and conditions created
by the non-union store); Giant Food Mkts, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 727 (1979) (picketing and
handbilling aimed at consumers urging them to boycott a store where the employer did not
provide area standard wages and benefits), remanded, 633 F.2d 18 (6th Cir. 1980); see also
supra text accompanying notes 79, 95.
187. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 848-49. The Court qualified this entitlement, however,
stating that "[i]t does not apply wherever nontrespassory access to [the targeted audience]
may be cumbersome or less-than-ideally effective." Id. at 849.
188. See supra notes 120-47 and accompanying text.
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action with the employer.' 89 This reality makes impulse buying a compelling consideration.' 90
A union arguably could expend all its efforts and resources on media
advertisements, such as radio, television, newspaper, magazine and billboard advertisements designed to communicate their message to potential consumers.' 9 1 Putting aside the impulse buying phenomenon, it is
possible that a court might conclude that such an advertising campaign
of communicating
provides the union with reasonably effective means192
with customers away from shopping center property.

Considering the effect of impulse buying, 193 however, may require a

different outcome. Depending on the product at issue,' 9 an extensive
media campaign designed to communicate with consumers simply may

not constitute a reasonable means of communicating with the intended
audience because the audience-here, consumers-is not defined until
either exposed to the product at the point of purchase or stimulated by an
in-store advertising display.' 95 It is only at this point that the audience
may become customers and thereby become identifiable.
189. See Giant Food, 241 N.L.R.B. at 727 (finding that customers were the primary
intended audience of the pickets and as such, only became identifiable when they decided
to enter the store). See generally supra text accompanying notes 120-47.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 170-83.
191. But see supra text accompanying note 103 (discussing the Board's awareness that
in certain instances, requiring a union to undertake a mass media campaign may be considered unreasonable). In Jean Country, the Board considered it unreasonable to require the
union to undertake a mass media campaign, particularly since the union would thereby
incur great costs and the message would have been removed from the situs. Jean Country,
291 N.L.R.B. 11, 18 n.18 (1988). In Lechmere, the Court did not vitiate the Board's position in disfavor of requiring unions to incur great expenses, rather, it allowed the issue to
rest on its merits, and simply stated that "other alternative means of communication were
readily available." Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 849.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 148-55; see also Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 849.
Although designed to address the union's attempt at making Lechmere's employees aware
of its organizational efforts, the Court held that even though the employees lived in a large
metropolitan area, they were not automatically rendered "'inaccessible."' Id. The Court
went on to find accessibility in the fact that the union had been able to contact a substantial
percentage of employees directly, via mailings, phone calls, and home visits. Id. Finally,
the Court mentioned that direct contact "is not a necessary element of 'reasonably effective' communication; signs or advertising may also suffice." Id.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 168-81. In order to analyze more effectively
their $15.3 billion impulse purchase market, British retailers and manufacturers have developed a system to record purchases from all retail outlets and thereby hope to capitalize
fully on the impulse purchase market. Andrew Don, New Consumer Panel to Aid British
Impulse Buy Market, FoOD & DRINK DAILY, May 25, 1993.
194. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text. As has been pointed out, a broad
range of products fall prey to impulse shoppers. See supra note 176 and accompanying
text.
195. See supra notes 173-79 and accompanying text; see also Giant Food Markets, Inc.,
241 N.L.R.B. 727, 728 (1979) (noting that potential customers only become identifiable to
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Consumer Picketing and Impulse Buying

Consumer picketing cases decided prior to Lechmere are no longer dispositive sources in delineating union rights in this area. 96 Both Scott
Hudgens and Giant Food establish that "means of communication other
than direct entry onto the employer's property .... [Cannot be considered 'reasonable' in relation to their possible effectiveness," where customers only become readily identifiable as they enter the store on
impulse."9
At a minimum, Lechmere invites a reappraisal of Scott
Hudgens and Giant Food. The Lechmere formula clearly stands for the
proposition that so long as reasonable access to consumers outside of the
employer's property exists, the requisite accommodation has taken
place.' 98 However, Lechmere also recognizes that the effectiveness of alternative means of communication remains an important consideration
199
when determining whether reasonable access to consumers exists.
Where consumers cannot be identified prior to the point of purchase due
to the reality of impulse buying, the effectiveness of alternative means of
communication becomes problematic.
V.

CONCLUSION

Prior to Lechmere, access cases were approached by balancing Section
7 rights against private property rights, taking into account the availability of alternative means of communication." 0 With its Lechmere decision, however, the Supreme Court has greatly clarified the status of rights
and accommodations of both employers and unions. Courts and the National Labor Relations Board will no longer balance the rights of competing parties, unless reasonable alternative access to the respective party is
infeasible.2" 1 Failure to consider the effects of impulse buying when applying the Lechmere test will effectively render consumer picketing
meaningless. The courts and the Board should recognize the dichotomy
between consumer picketing and union efforts aimed at employees.
Given the reality of impulse buying, the courts and the Board should perthe union when they decide to enter the store, which may be on impulse as a result of an ad
in the window of the store), remanded, 633 F.2d 18 (6th Cir. 1980).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 120-47.
197. Giant Food Mkts, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 727, 729 (1979) (emphasis added).

198. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 848-49 (1992).
199. Lechmere does establish that success or effectiveness may be relevant in determining whether reasonable access exists. Id. at 842.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 120-47; see also Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 848
(rejecting the Board's multi-factor balancing test of competing interests as developed in
the Jean Country line of cases).
201. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 848. By infeasible, the Court refers to the narrow exception it recognizes where parties (the employees in Lechmere) are "'beyond the reach of
reasonable union efforts to communicate with them."' Id. at 849 (quoting NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956)).
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mit a union to address consumers as close to the retail establishment as
possible. In essence, this translates into allowing the union access to persuade consumers not to follow their impulse when making purchasing
decisions.
Since impulse buying is triggered at the point of purchase, the Lechmere calculus must assure unions access to the point of purchaseoutside the store on an employer's private property. Lechmere creates
the analysis by which all cases involving private property rights will now
be shaped, including consumer picketing cases involving private property
rights. Fitting that analysis with the reality of impulse buying will, no
doubt, rekindle the union access debate.
Marc E. Jaffan

